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Observations on the Nature of Joint 
Ventures in Mexico: 
Are They Involuntary and 
Transitory Institutions? 
by Michael Wallace Gordon* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The equity joint international business venture l increasingly is referred to 
by leaders of the developing nations of the Third World as one of the most ap-
propriate forms of direct foreign investment. 2 Although equity joint ventures 
'Professor of Law and Latin American Studies, University of Florida; Of Counsel, Ogarrio, 
Gaxiola y Diaz, Mexico City, Mexico. 
1. In the widest sense, the' 'joint venture" comprises any form of association which im-
plies collaboration for more than a very transitory period .... Such partnerships show 
a great variety of patterns. There may be "50-50" partnerships, in which the local in-
vestor - public or private - holds one-half of the shares, and the foreign investor, the 
other half. There may be equity associations in which one partner holds a m,yority 
(though often only 51 percent of the shares) and the other partner the minority. An ex-
isting enterprise may be transformed into a joint venture with the foreign investor re-
taining a controlling interest, while the minority shares are held by the local govern-
ment or a government-controlled development corporation, a small group of local 
capitalists, or the public. 
W. FRIEDMANN & G. KALMANOFF. JOINT INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS VENTURES 6 (1961) 
[hereinafter cited as FRIEDMANN & KALMANOFFj. 
Joint ventures normally consist either of closely held corporations in which two or 
more companies control the venture on an approximately equal basis, or of partner-
ships combining asset contributions by the participants. If a corporate framework is 
used, the delicate balance which must be preserved between the interests of the joint 
venture participants may well be impossible to maintain in the light of the high degree 
of negotiability required of open capital companies. 
Ness, Brazil: Local Equity Participation in Multinational Enterprises, 6 LAW & POL'Y INTL Bus. 1017, 
1041 (1974). It has been defined by United States Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals as the rela-
tionship created when two or more persons combine in ajoint business enterprise for their mutual 
benefit with the understanding that they are to share in the profits or losses and that each is to 
have a voice in its management. Chisholm v. Gilmer, 81 F.2d 120, 124 (4th Cir. 1936). 
2. Many proposals have been advanced for the systematic localization of multinational enter-
prise (MNE) operations in less developed countries (LDCs) and the impact of such policies on 
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constitute the most significant contemporary form of joint ventures, one 
should not assume that non-equity joint ventures have been rendered of little 
importance between a developing nation company and an enterprise in the 
developed world. While the transfer of technology3 from the latter to the 
former does not constitute an equity joint venture, it is a non-equity joint ven-
ture association of great importance to Third World development. Where the 
equity joint venture is utilized by developing nations as a method to reduce 
foreign direct investment in certain spheres of activity, whether that reduction 
amounts to a termination of the foreign interest or its assumption of a minor-
ity position, there may be an important continuing relationship between the 
foreign, former majority equity holder and the newly, wholly or majority 
locally owned enterprise in the form of a technology agreement. An equity 
future investment in these areas. See Franko, International Joint Ventures in Developing Countries: 
Mystique and Reality, 6 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 315 (1974); see generally L. TURNER, MULTINA· 
TIONAL COMPANIES AND THE THIRD WORLD 104-07 (1973); J. STOPFORD & L. WELLS, MANAG· 
ING THE MULTINATIONAL ENTERPRISE 105 (1972). 
The case studies by this writer initially in Mexico, and currently in Central America and 
Panama, tend to illustrate that the principal contemporary view of the joint venture is as an in-
voluntary, transitory institution, although it may be promoted by the host nation government as 
a long-term assC'ciation of foreign and local capital. The joint ventures studied in Mexico includ-
ed: Armco; Bristol Aeroplane; Celanese; Chrysler; Container Corporation of America; Dow 
Chemical; Gillette; GTE Sylvania; Heinz; Holiday Inns; IBM; Kimberly-Clark; Monsanto; Pan 
American Sulfur; Philip Morris; Sanborn Hermonos; Toyoda of Japan; Tubos de Acero; 
Walgreen; and Westinghouse. The studies took place in Mexico during 1974-1976 and will be 
elaborated upon in detail in a forthcoming book, JOINT INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS VENTURES IN 
MEXICO. For an account of Mexicanization problems encountered by other U.S. MNEs 
(Firestone, Ralston-Purina, General Motors and Dupont), see Mexico Screening Investors, N.Y. 
Times, Mar. 24, 1979, at 25, col. 3. It would be useful to consider these cases in another decade 
to provide further observations on the transitory and involuntary characteristics of these joint 
venture institutions. More recent studies undertaken in Central America and Panama, not yet 
completed, illustrate the joint venture in that area as a very different institution. The Central 
American nations and Panama lack the leverage to uniformly demand joint ventures in all, or 
nearly all, foreign investment. However, they have discovered it to be increasingly effective as a 
negotiated institution for large foreign investments which are highly visible, e.g., the extractive, 
export oriented industries. The observations above thus concentrate on the Mexican joint ven-
tures, followed by a few preliminary comments on the joint venture in Central America and 
Panama. See § VI. D, E irifra. 
3. See, e.g., Ley Sobre el Registro de la Transferencia de Technologia y el Uso y Explotaci6n 
de Patentes y Marcas, Dec. 28, 1972, D.O., Dec. 30, 1972 (Mex.), translated in 12 INT'L LEGAL 
MAT'LS 421 (1973); Gordon, The Contemporary Mexican Approach to Growth with Foreign Investment: 
Controlled But Participatory Independence, 10 CALIF. W. L. REV. 1 (1973); Ley de Transferencia de 
Technologia, Sept. 27, 1974, (1974] A Anuario No. 20.794, translated in 14 INDUS. PROP. 338 
(1975); Giacchino, Foreign Investment Under Contemporary Argentine Law, 26 AM.J. COMPo L. 91 
(1977); Standard Regime for Treatment of Foreign Capital and for Treatment of Marks, Patents, 
Licenses and Royalties, Dec. 30,1970, (1971] R.O. No. 264, at 1 (Ecuador), translated in 11 INT'L 
LEGALMAT'LS 126 (1972), as amended, translated in 16 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 138 (1977); Oliver, The 
Andean Foreign Investment Code: A New Phase in the Quest for Normative Order, 66 AM. J. INT'L L. 763 
(1972). Asian Third World nations have adopted also transfer of technology legislation. See, e.g., 
Hilado, The Legal and Administrative Regulation of Transfer of Technology: The Philippine Selling, 51 
PHIL. L. J. 69 (1976). 
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joint venture may be effectively transformed into a non-equity joint venture 
when the host nation enterprise assumes total ownership and control of the 
local entity, but continues a relationship with the foreign entity through an 
agreement for the transfer of technology. The fade-out 4 use of the equity joint 
venture will in effect render the non-equity joint venture of greater impor-
tance than in times of unchallenged, dominant foreign controlled investment. 
Continual receipt of technology by the developing nations will often 
necessitate the use of non-equity joint ventures. As a result, those nations 
adopting fade-out equity joint venture concepts must be careful that the 
legislation is not so restrictive that it results in a negative foreign investor at-
titude towards any form of continued contact, e.g.) a non-equity joint venture 
for the transfer of technology. 
This article will examine the nature of joint ventures in Mexico between 
foreign, primarily United States, corporations and their affiliates and sub-
sidiaries. The focus of these case studies will be on whether the joint ventures 
are: 1) involuntary or voluntary and; 2) transitory or non-transitory. 
II. THE EQUITY J OINT VENTURE 
The equity Jomt venture is not a new form of business association for 
developing nations. It long has been used by foreign investors wishing to limit 
their capital investment in a particular nation or desirous of obtaining local 
4. See Meeker, Fade-Out Joint Venture: Can It Work for Latin America?, INTER·AM. ECON. AFF .. 
Spring 1971, at 25. The Mexican fade-out provision is Article 5 of the Law of Feb. 7, 1973, Con-
cerning Promotion of Mexican Investment and the Regulation of Foreign Investment, [1973] 317 
Diario Official [D.O.] No.7, at 5 (Mex.), translated in 12 INT"L LEGAL MAT"LS 643 (1973). The 
law went into effect 60 days after publication on May 8, 1973. There is a significant difference in 
the context of the fade-out provisions of Mexico and the Andean Code. 
In Mexico, control over foreign investors is being exercised from a position of 
strength. Mexico has a developed infrastructure and industrial base, the means to ex-
tract natural resources, and a growing export trade with the developed world. It needs 
to maintain a flow of capital and technology provided largely by transnational corpora-
tions, but no longer must accept it on any terms. Mexico offers the investor a growing 
domestic market, monetary stability, and a convenient location for access to other 
markets in the hemisphere. These factors encourage foreign investment by raising the 
probability that it will be successful. In its new code, Mexico is merely regulating 
foreigners' access to these advantages. The Andean countries, however, cannot deal 
from the position of strength that Mexico enjoys. Their industrial base is small and 
their support systems, such as communications, electric power, transportation, and 
skilled labor are far behind Mexico's. Only a few industries are sufficiently deVeloped to 
compete in the world market; hence the ANCOM countries n(;ed the assistance of 
modern technology and great infusions of capital in order to achieve the industrializa-
tion they require to maintain their independence. 
Schill, The Mexican and Andean Investment Codes: An Overview and Comparison, 6 LAW & POL'Y INT"L 
Bus. 437,471-72 (1974) (citations omitted). 
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partners for anyone of a number of reasons. 5 This form of participation in the 
joint venture has been accepted by the foreign investor on a voluntary basis in 
contrast to the increasingly frequent host-nation imposed joint venture form. 
This joint venture is quite clearly an involuntary venture from the viewpoint 
of the managers of the foreign enterprise. 6 The equity joint venture has been 
used increasingly as a form of new foreign owned enterprises. This increasing 
use of the joint venture has evolved from: 1) the developing nations' legislative 
and administrative preference for increasing local participation in the means 
of production and distribution; and 2) an increased awareness on the part of 
foreign investors of their ability to adapt the joint venture enterprise to the 
needs of the foreign investor, e.g., to reduce the foreign investor's profile in 
the developing nation. 
The joint venture is a more complex form of business association than one 
might first expect; it also appears increasingly identified as an involuntary and 
transitory institution. Nevertheless, it is important to recognize that although 
it most often may be identified as involuntary and transitory, the joint venture 
may also be in the form of: 1) a voluntary and transitory association; or 2) a 
voluntary and long-term arrangement; or 3) less frequently, an involuntary, 
but long-term association. 
A. The Joint International Business Venture as an Institutional 
Structure for Development 
The joint international business venture has been the primary institutional 
structure for the process of Mexicanization. 7 The process of Mexicanization 
has involved a planned transference of the infrastructure and, to increasing 
degrees, much of the means of production and distribution to local ownership. 
It is a process based on an ultimate goal of placing in the hands of either Mex-
ican private or public ownership all of those economic enterprises which have 
5. See generally FRIEDMANN & KALMANOFF, supra note I, at 125-54; W. FRIEDMANN & J. 
BEGUlN,JOINT INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS VENTURES IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 1-29 (1971); K. 
BNENS& E. LOVELL,JOINTVENTURESWITH FOREIGN PARTNERS (1966); S. NAVADAN, WAYS TO 
MINIMIZE OBSTACLE CONFRONTING JOINT VENTURES IN THE REGION: THE AlTITUDES OF THE 
PARTNERS (Int'I Chamber of Commerce Doc. No. 520-XIV/I03 1966). 
6. Interviews with managers of various subsidiaries, supra note 2. 
7. Creel, Mexicanization: A Case of Creeping Expropriation, 22 SW. L. J. 281 (1968). Mexicaniza-
tion requires that local investors be allowed to participate in the ownership and control of both 
new and existing foreign-owned commercial enterprises. For examples of comparative ap-
proaches, see generally FOREIGN INVESTMENT: THE EXPERIENCE OF HOST COUNTRIES (I. Litvak & 
C. Maule eds. 1970); R. McLAUGHLIN, FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND DEVELOPMENT IN LIBERIA 
(1966) (see especially bibliography at 211-17); FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND INDUSTRIALIZATION IN 
SINGAPORE(H. Hughes & Y. P. Seng eds. 1969); M.E. HILL, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN CANADA 
AND THE FOREIGN INVESTMENT REVIEW ACTS (1978); FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN LATIN AMERICA: 
CASESANDATTITUDES(M. Bergsteined. 1966); I. LnvAK&C. MAULE,FOREIGNINVESTMENT 
IN MEXICO: SOME LESSONS FORCANADA(1971); OECD, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN YUGOSLAVIA 
(1970); OECD, FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN YUGOSLAVIA (1974). 
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a significant effect on Mexican development. The goal does not appear to be a 
total transference of all private investment to Mexican hands nor an attempt 
to replace the private sector with public ownership in all areas of economic ac-
tivity.8 Foreign investment under the pattern of Mexicanization is to regulate 
that investment so that it contributes to Mexican development, but does not 
conflict with Mexican political, economic and socio-cultural concepts and 
goals. 9 
Since a smooth transference from foreign to local ownership is difficult to 
accomplish in one step when an enterprise is wholly foreign owned, the joint 
venture becomes the structure adopted to reduce, but in almost all cases, not 
altogether remove, the foreign presence. What is not clear is whether the joint 
venture structure is principally a transitory institution or whether it is in-
tended to be a long-term relationship which will allow the foreign companies 
to retain indefinitely what is usually a significant minority interest, forty-nine 
percent. If the joint venture is viewed only as a transitory device to totally 
remove foreign presence, foreign investors may begin to prefer an initial total 
withdrawal rather than accept a joint venture stage for an undetermined 
number of years, under the belief that the process of nationalization would 
8. The concept of "key sector" regulation has received much attention. Generally it has been 
defined in the following terms: 
The term' 'basic industry" can be interpreted in the broader or narrower sense of the 
word. Sometimes it can be understood to mean the branches of industry which are the 
basic conditions for the whole economic system, thus the raw materials and auxiliaries 
essential for the production, amongst which the sources of energy (electricity and 
mineral oil) are wholly or partly ranged. Sometimes the term is expanded even further 
to include the raw materials which are necessary for particular important national ac-
tivities as well. Sometimes it only refers to the public utilities, thus to the production of 
electricity, gas and water and the communication services - railways, telephone, 
telegraph, radio, television and the postal services. Elsewhere the essential sources of 
wealth of the country, and then particularly the exploitation of minerals, are included in 
this. 
FOUNDATION FOR ECONOMIC RESEARCH, UNIVERSITY OF AMSTERDAM, MANAGEMENT OF DIRECT 
INVESTMENT IN LESS DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 75 (1957) [hereinafter cited as FOUNDATION 
RESEARCH]; see Barnes, Foreign Investment in CantJIiIJ and Mexico: An Agerulafor Host Country Screening, 
1 B.C. INT'L & COMPo L.J. 1 (1977) for a comparative analysis. 
9. World War II and its aftermath has seen a growing self-confidence in Mexican solu-
tions to Mexico's developmental problems. The basic problem remaining today is that 
of whether to capitalize rapidly, and thereby sacrifice another generation of the poorer 
elements in society, or whether to distribute immediately, and thereby possibly stultify 
rapid economic growth .... 
In any case, Mexican nationalism today is related to industrialization and a mixed 
system of government and private ownership. Xenophobia has been successfully 
relegated to the more realistic control over rather than escape from foreign capital. 
There is also a growing concern with modernization of the agricultural sector which 
would free the rural worker for urban employment in mass-producing units. Indeed, 
this is one of the areas in which the revolutionary ideology of uplifting the indigenous 
sectors of society conforms with national development criteria. 
P. RANIS, FIVE LATIN AMERICANS: A COMPARATIVE POLITICAL STUDY 212-13 (1971); !ee also F. 
TURNER, THE DYNAMIC OF MEXICAN NATIONALISM (1968). 
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ultimately require complete withdrawal of equity participation. A clearer 
understanding of the joint venture will allow foreign investors a greater 
assurance of certainty of their investments. It will also provide a host govern-
ment with greater assurance of its ability to utilize the process of nationaliza-
tion in various areas of economic activity without receiving a negative foreign 
investment reaction or the more disruptive potential conflict resulting in total 
foreign withdrawal from industries where some continued participation is 
needed for optimum development. 
B. Joint Ventures in Mexico 
1. Historical Development Since 1950 
Joint ventures in Mexico are not concentrated in anyone particular in-
dustry. They exist in some of the very largest industries including steel, 
automobile manufacturing, plastics, chemicals and smaller consumer goods, 
as well as in various service industries. Direct foreign investment has tended to 
phase out in sectors dealing with agriculture, although the joint venture played 
a part in that fade-out. 10 Earlier joint ventures in steel production and in min-
ing have been altered with the result that the foreign equity participation has 
withdrawn. One tends to associate those industries where there has been a pat-
tern of fade-out legislation reducing the foreign investment with corporations 
in sectors which have been subject to increasing State participation for 
decades. These are primarily the extractive, export oriented industries. Addi-
tionally, restrictions placed on the use of land in Mexico, combined with 
Government sensitivity regarding the demands of the rural peasant, have 
created conflicts when foreign investment was involved in food production. 
The same issue also has arisen in the tobacco industry which has seen an in-
creasing withdrawal of foreign investment from various stages of the industry. 
This withdrawal commenced with the growing stage (the area most directly 
related to working with Mexican farmers) and then reached into the actual 
production of tobacco products. 
The use of the joint venture in Mexico is on a large scale basis. It is not 
limited to periodic pressures calling for some minimum level of Mexican par-
ticipation in share ownership and control of selected enterprises; rather it 
follows a very clear and broadly encompassing pattern of the Mexican 
Government in desiring nearly all foreign investment to limit its equity and 
control participation to a minority position.H Where foreign corporations 
have been willing to relinquish majority ownership and control, they have not 
10. See note 4 supra. 
11. See FRIEDMANN & KALMANOFF. supra note 1, at 99. While in most industries a 49 percent 
minority is allowed, in mining the limitation is 25 or 40 percent, depending on the type of mining 
venture. 
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opted consistently to retain the full forty-nine percent permitted by the 
Government, although usually they retained a significant minority interest. 
The joint venture form was used often in the 1950s and 1960s by foreign 
enterprises as a base from which to acquire increasing percentages of Mexican 
corporations. 12 This pattern was reversed in the 1970s when the joint venture 
was adopted by the Government as a method to reduce foreign participation in 
direct investment. The increasing acquisition of Mexican businesses by 
foreign investors was one of the motivating factors which led to the Govern-
ment's curtailment of further acquisitions13 and to a Government imposed 
reversal of the use of the joint venture to begin a fade-out of some foreign in-
vestment. 
The last ten years has constituted a decade of exceptionally strong emphasis 
on increasing local ownership and control of various sectors of the economy. 14 
During this period the joint venture has been established as an involuntary 
and transitory institution to assist in achieving Mexicanization goals. The 
earlier joint venture had been more of a voluntary institution utilized by 
foreign investors to gain an equity position in Mexican industries. Those com-
panies also had viewed the joint venture as transitory. However, this was only 
in the sense that they often attempted to alter the joint venture and acquire a 
100 percent equity position, which the company then viewed only as a long 
term investment. 
A consistent pattern was discovered pertaining to those corporations with a 
majority interest, and more particularly, with wholly foreign-owned 6ub-
sidiaries in Mexico, but also with some comparatively recent minority owner-
ship participation in joint ventures in other Third World countries. These 
companies preferred not to be subjected to any comparative analysis involving 
their Mexican enterprises and their other joint ventures or with other com-
panies in Mexico, especially competitors which operated in the joint venture 
form. The resistance was stronger where the company had a wholly foreign-
owned subsidiary in Mexico and several majority foreign-owned joint venture 
subsidiaries in other Third World nations, or where their Mexican subsidiary 
was wholly foreign-owned and they had submitted to minority participation in 
12. For a brief narration of foreign investment in Mexico since the Revolution in 1910, see 
Gordon, The Joint Venture as an Institutionfor Mexican Development: A Legislative History, 1978 ARIZ. 
ST. L.J. 173; Schill, The Mexican and Andean Investment Codes: An Overview and Comparison, 6 LAW & 
POL'Y INT'L Bus. 437, 441-48 (1974). For a more complete analysis, see, e.g., H. WRIGHT, 
FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN MEXICO (1971); R. HANSEN, THE POLITICS OF MEXICAN DEVELOPMENT 
(1971). For foreign investment figures, see R.S. NEWFARMER& W.F. MUELLER, 94th CONG., 1ST 
SESS., MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS IN BRAZIL AND MEXICO: STRUCTURAL SOURCES OF 
ECONOMIC AND NONECONOMIC POWER 36, table 2-6. (Comm. Print 1975) [hereinafter cited as 
REPORT]. 
13. See REPORT, supra note 12, at 45-95. 
14, See note 8 supra. 
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joint ventures in other Third World nations. This should not be surprising. It 
may well be assumed that the initial submission to a majority foreign-owned 
joint venture for a company which previously had only wholly foreign-owned 
subsidiaries, or the submission to a minority position by a company with 
previous majority foreign ownership, undoubtedly occurred in an involuntary 
fashion and not as a result of any change in company policy to accept an affir-
mative fade-out position. IS All of the companies studied,16 where the question 
was appropriate, appeared quite reluctant to participate in a joint venture 
form where a wholly foreign-owned subsidiary was legally permissible. 
In a few cases there were acknowledged benefits to the joint venture form, 
but these were judged to be quite limited. 17 In only a few of the studies was the 
Mexican subsidiary not at some time wholly, or near wholly, owned by the 
foreign parent. The more typical joint venture experience of those enterprises 
studied involved the initial formation of a wholly foreign-owned subsidiary or 
the use of the joint venture to obtain wholly foreign-owned or near wholly 
owned status. 
This illustrates one of the dilemmas of Mexico's development. It would be 
possible for the Mexican Government to adopt an Eastern European ap-
proachl8 to development and nationalize all foreign business with probably lit-
tle more fear of retaliation then evidenced in the experiences of nationalization 
throughout the world in the past decade, and most likely without suffering 
from an economic boycott such as was applied to Cuba. 19 A total nationaliza-
tion would provide the base from which Mexico could adopt an Eastern Euro-
pean approach, i. e., by allowing joint ventures only with a minority foreign 
equity position. 20 There is a time element involved in such process, however. 
It has taken several decades for the dislocations caused by the nationalizations 
15. See REPORT, supra note 12, at 69, table 4-8, which lists degree of equity ownership of U.S. 
affiliates in Mexico. 
16. See note 2 supra. 
17. Before one suggests hypocrisy on the part of company officials, it is necessary to recognize 
that a corporation which accepts a minority position in a new joint venture, where it is the only 
way in which it is permitted to operate, may yet consistently argue strongly against altering a 
wholly foreign-owned or a majority foreign-owned subsidiary to a minority position. A company 
may argue, not inconsistently, that it cannot feasibly redll&t its wholly foreign-owned status in one 
of its Latin American subsidiaries which has been functioning for several years, but that it will ac-
cept a minority status in a venture in a socialist nation in Eastern Europe, or even in another 
Latin American nation, where a minority foreign equity position is the only method of doing 
business which is permitted. One thus should not assume that a company which participates in a 
number of minority and/or majority owned joint ventures in other Third World or socialist na-
tions has reached that stage from an earlier position of total ownership. 
18. See Gordon,Joint Ventures in Eastern Europe, 9 TEX. INT'L L.J. 281 (1974); Burgess, Direct 
Foreign Investment in Eastern Europe: Problems and Prospects of Romania 'sJoint Venture Legislatiott, 6 LAW 
& POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1059 (1974). 
19. See generally M. GORDON, THE CUBAN NATIONALIZATIONS: THE DEMISE OF FOREIGN 
PRIVATE PROPERTY (1976). 
20. See note 18 supra. 
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in Eastern Europe to moderate to the point where companies were once again 
willing to consider Eastern Europe for direct foreign investment. It would be 
inconceivable for Mexico to successfully undertake a massive nationalization 
and then immediately invite foreign direct investment under the Eastern 
European model. 21 
Mexico appears to be following a more difficult but preferred path toward a 
similar end result of limiting nearly all foreign investment to a maximum of 
forty-nine percent. This is essentially the position in Eastern European na-
tions. 22 Mexico is utilizing a number of devices short of nationalization, both 
administrative and legislative, to persuade the acceptance of minority status 
by foreign corporations with current investments in Mexico of greater than 
minority equity interest. At the same time Mexico is trying to avoid 
discouraging new capital from entering the nation. It is unquestionably a 
tenuous task, but it is the method perceived by Mexico at this time as one that 
combines the long term benefits of Mexican control over the means of produc-
tion and distribution with minimum current economic dislocation. The 
Government has adopted periodically legislation which changed the rules of 
the game,23 but only to the degree which has resulted in a limited amount of 
21. The time lag is dramatically illustrated by the case of Cuba. Nearly twenty years after the 
confiscation of foreign property there is talk of renewed relations, but not of direct foreign invest-
ment, at least partially because of the outstanding foreign claims. See Gordon, The Cuban Claims 
Act: Progress in the Development of a Viable Valuation Process in the FCSC, 13 SANTA CLARA LAW. 625 
(1973). In the case of the People's Republic of China the situation arose in 1949 and only recently 
has been settled. See Comment, U. S. People's Republic of China Blocked Assets and Claims Problem: In-
ternational and Domestic Law, 2 B.C. INT'L & COMPo L.J. 81 (1978). 
22. See note 18 supra. 
23. In a presentation to the important Bilateral Committee of United States-Mexican 
Businessmen, then United States Ambassador Robert H. McBride stated: "Many [investors) are 
unclear as to whether or not foreign investment is still desired [in Mexico) and whether the rules 
of the game are changing, not only for new investment but also for established firms." Miami 
Herald, Jan. 21, 1973, S G, at 21, col. 2. The statement received substantial criticism from Ml:.JI;:. 
ican officials. The basic legislation is the Ley Para Promover la Inversion Mexicana y Regular la . 
Inversion Extranjera, Law of Feb. 7, 1973; [1973)317 D.O. No.7, at 5 (Mex.), translated in 12 ) 
INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 643 U[l1)Lhere'inafter cited as Investment Law). ...-
-Artfderoftii;I~~;t"in~nt La~'~t~tes tliai' its purpose is to stimulate a just and balanced 
development and consolidate the country's economic independence. /d., art. 1. Article 5 imposes 
a 49% limit on foreign ownership of domestic enterprises with exceptions provided for 1) second-
ary petrochemicals (40%), 2) special mining concessions (34%), 3) sectors regulated by specific 
law or regulation. /d., art. 5. Considerable discretion is given to the National Commission on 
Foreign Investment to interpret and determine conditions of entry for foreign investment based 
upon the seventeen standards in Article 13. /d., arts. 11-17. Article 13 states: 
In order to determine the convenience of authorizing foreign investment and in order 
to establish the percentages and conditions by which it shall be ruled, the Commission 
shall take into consideration the following criteria and characteristics of the investment: 
I. That it should be conplementary to national investment; 
II. That it should not displace national business enterprises that are operating 
satisfactorily, and that it should not enter fields that are adequately covered by them; 
III. Its positive effects on the balance of payments and, especially, on the increase of 
Mexican exports; 
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adverse, verbal response from foreign enterprises, and which has not been 
coupled with a withdrawal of needed investments. This would suggest that the 
joint venture, the principal institution being used to accomplish this alteration 
of the ownership of the means of production and distribution, assumes an in-
voluntary and transitory nature from the viewpoint of the foreign investor. 
III. CASE STUDIES 
A. Whol(y Owned Subsidiaries Which Divested: Philip Morris, 
Industrias Resistol (Monsanto), Pan American Sulphur and Kimber(y-Clark 
Of the joint venture studies, Philip Morris, Industrias Resistol (Monsanto), 
Pan American Sulphur and Kimberly-Clark all began as wholly foreign-
owned companies, later divesting all or some of their equity. Philip Morris 
and Pan American Sulphur both fully withdrew voluntarily from their Mex-
ican investments under pressure from the Government. Monsanto reduced its 
total ownership to a minority 42 percent position as a result of Government 
pressure while Kimberly-Clark reduced its ownership share to 43 percent, not 
as a result of direct pressure, but because the company officials predicted the 
trend of Mexicanization. It would appear that in each of these cases the reduc-
tion of the 100 percent foreign ownership was involuntary, although less so in 
the case of Kimberly-Clark, where there is no clear, disclosed evidence of ac-
tual Government pressure to Mexicanize. It is more likely that the "volun-
tary" Mexicanization of Kimberly-Clark occurred because of more careful 
IV. Its effect on employment, taking into account job opportunities created and 
wages paid; 
V. The employment and training of Mexican technicians and management person-
nel; 
VI. The incorporation of domestic inputs and components in the manufacture of its 
products; 
VII. The extent to which it finances its operations with resources from abroad; 
VIII. The diversification of sources of investment and the need to foster Latin 
American regional and subregional integration; 
IX. Its contribution to the development of the relatively less economically developed 
zones or regions; 
X. That it should not enjoy monopolistic positions in the domestic market; 
XI. The capital structure of the branch of economic activity involved; 
XII. Its supply of technology and its contribution to technological research and 
development in the country; 
XIII. Its effect on price levels and production quality; 
XIV. That it respect the country's social and cultural values; 
XV. The importance of the activity in question in the context of the country's 
economy; 
XVI. The extent to which the foreign investor is identified with the country's in-
terest and his involvement with foreign centers of economic decision; and 
XVII. In general, the extent to which it complies with, and contributes to the 
achievement of national development policy objectives. 
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corporate planning, not because of an affirmative company policy to accept a 
minority equity position in the Mexican enterprise. This corporate planning 
included an awareness and sensitivity to the various nationalistic patterns and 
pressures of the Third World governments. 
The Mexicanization of Monsanto was noticeably involuntary. Relations 
with the Mexican Government in the late 1960s were not good and substantial 
pressure was placed on the company to Mexicanize. Since the company suc-
cumbed to Government pressure, the joint venture has been successful and the 
company's relations with the Mexican Government has improved. 
The Philip Morris and Pan American Sulphur withdrawals involved quite a 
different pressure. The former resulted from the concern of the Mexican 
Government not to create unsettled conditions in rural areas and the latter 
because of the desire of the Mexican Government to assume State ownership 
of the mining industry. The reduction of Philip Morris' interest from total 
foreign ownership to a joint venture and then to a withdrawal illustrates the 
totally involuntary use of the joint venture as a device to terminate foreign 
participation in a Government perceived sensitive sphere. Philip Morris was 
not the only tobacco company subjected to pressure to Mexicanize. It was, 
however, more reluctant than some of its competitors to alter its total foreign 
ownership to a minority position. 
B. Whol?;! Owned Subsidiaries Which Did Not Divest 
1. Heinz 
Although Heinz began with a 100 percent foreign owned operation, it was a 
small enterprise until it expanded significantly by the questionably ap-
propriate acquisition of a number of food processing plants. Fortunately it ac-
cepted a joint venture at that time which lessened its risk in the venture. The 
Heinz experience is not an example of the reduction of a wholly or near wholly 
foreign-owned enterprise initially to various stages of majority and then to 
minority equity participation. Heinz withdrew completely because of dif-
ficulties which related to some of the protectionist, albeit uneconomic, policies 
of the Mexican Government toward the small farmer. 
2. IBM and Dow Chemical 
The officers of those companies studied24 which have remained 100 percent 
foreign-owned have clearly expressed a preference for total foreign ownership. 
IBM has perhaps the strongest anti-joint venture policy of any l,¥,ge corpora-
tion. The fact that the company has not participated in-any equity joint ven-
tures, combined with the leverage it possesses because of its sophisticated 
24. See note 2 supra. 
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technology, has allowed it to successfully continue its operation in Mexico as a 
wholly foreign-owned subsidiary. The Dow Chemical operation also has 
maintained total foreign ownership of its Mexican subsidiary despite the fact 
that it participates in many joint ventures throughout the world, including 
those in which it accepts minority equity positions. For the most part, Dow's 
joint ventures have evolved because of a preference for the joint venture by the 
host nation rather than from any desire by Dow to initiate joint ventures. 
Where the company has been able to obtain ownership, it has done so and at-
tempted to maintain that position. It generally has been successful because of 
its technological contributions to the host nation. Although those contribu-
tions often have involved technology available from other competitors, at least 
to a greater degree than with IBM, Dow's relations with the Mexican Govern-
ment appear to have been consistently favorable and the company has been 
subjected to comparatively little pressure to Mexicanize. 
3. Procter & Gamble and Container Corporation 
Procter & Gamble's operation in Mexico is quite different from the above 
corporations. It also has been able to retain a 100 percent ownership position 
although it does not possess the high-level, sophisticated technology of either 
IBM or Dow. Competitors of Procter & Gamble include companies which 
have accepted the joint venture form. Of all the cases included in the study 
which have total or near total foreign ownership, Procter & Gamble would ap-
pear to have the least technology leverage to retain 100 percent foreign owner-
ship in the face of Mexicanization pressures. 
Another company in a similar position is Container Corporation's Mexican 
subsidiary, Carton y Papel. Initially fifty percent foreign-owned, the parent 
corporation was able to increase its equity to total ownership, partially as a 
result of dissatisfaction with the joint venture arrangement. This company 
also lacks the sophisticated technology of Dow or IBM. As is the situation with 
Procter & Gamble, a number of its competitors in Mexico are either joint ven-
tures or wholly Mexican-owned companies. Carton y Papel appears to be in a 
position similar to that of Procter & Gamble, i.e., lacking leverage to avoid 
Mexicanization. Any alteration to a joint venture would be clearly involun-
tary and both companies prefer to keep a low profile in Mexico to avoid rais-
ing the issue of Mexicanization. 
4. Chrysler 
The Chrysler Mexican venture can be considered essentially wholly foreign-
owned since the parent Chrysler Corporation owns 99.1 percent of its Mex-
ican subsidiary. The automobile industry has not been the subject of Mex-
icanization pressures. 25 If any of the automobile companies do relinquish 
25. The Government experienced an unsuccessful automobile venture with Borgward, 
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some of their ownership and form joint ventures, it may be because Govern-
ment restrictions have limited profits severely. Such a change would in effect 
constitute the adoption of involuntary joint ventures caused not as a result of 
direct Mexicanization pressures, but because of the indirect effect of Govern-
ment regulation. These restrictions, particularly price controls, could well 
cause disinvestment in the same manner as Government restrictions con-
tributed to the withdrawal of Heinz and the tobacco companies. A joint ven-
ture is no less involuntary when it results from a company's decision to reduce 
its equity because of operation restrictions which might be termed indirect 
Mexicanization than when it does from direct Government pressure. 
IV. CHARACTERIZATION OF THE]OINT VENTURES 
A. Involuntary Joint Ventures 
The involuntary nature of the joint venture in most of the case studies is 
supported by the expressed desire of many of the companies which retain total 
or majority foreign ownership to avoid any joint venture. Significantly, this 
includes those companies which do not have the leverage of Dow or IBM to 
maintain that status. 26 Several of these companies expressed an interest in 
having their case studies withdrawn from the project. This concern is consis-
tent with their intention to maintain a low profile in order to avoid any con-
frontation with the Government which could directly or indirectly raise the 
question of Mexicanization. 
Although one might agree that an attempt to maintain a low profile by 
multinational corporations in Third World nations is an appropriate concept, 
it appears that the purpose of the low profile may be to avoid a current 
manifestation of a confrontation that may be inevitable in the longer term. 
Such an approach would be most appropriate where the host country has ex-
perienced frequent and extreme political fluctuations, at least in attitudes 
toward the role of foreign investment. Thus, a corporation might hope to re-
main wholly foreign-owned during the period of a nationalization-oriented 
government by maintaining a low profile and accepting the tensions in its rela-
tions with the government. It then could exist without pressure during an ad-
ministration with a less restrictive approach toward foreign direct investment. 
This is not a policy which can be adopted with the expectation of success in 
Mexico. Continuity and stability have been characteristics of the Mexican 
although its more recent participation with Renault has been comparatively successful. The 
myriad of governmental regulations affecting the automobile industry, including price controls, 
import quotas and local content requirements, appears so complex that a paradoxical situation 
exists, the Government appears disinterested in substantial participation in an industry which it 
so rigidly and restrictively regulates. 
26. E.g., Procter & Gamble and Container Corporation. § III. B.3 supra. 
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government for many decades. The process of Mexicanization illustrates a 
continual progression toward substantially increased local participation in the 
means of production and distribution. 27 It is doubtful that the process of Mex-
icanization will be reversed although it may be slowed considerably, or even 
halted for a time, providing companies which successfully had avoided Mex-
icanization with some temporary security from the acceptance of an involun-
tary joint venture. 
Some companies decide not to hold out for as long as their technological 
leverage or low profiles will allow, concluding that there is an inevitable man-
date for change in the structure of nearly all foreign investment. These com-
panies face the decision of adopting the most appropriate alternative for 
disinvesting. They are likely to wish to avoid total withdrawal from a large, 
expanding and presumably profitable market and the association in an un-
satisfactory joint venture, such as one which may include the Mexican 
Government as the majority partner. While the alternative of having a Mex-
ican Government development organization such as NAFINSA28 or 
SOMEX29 as a partner should not be considered as inevitably unfavorable, it 
is a situation which might be avoided where a company accepts the joint ven-
ture at a time when it has a larger number of private options regarding poten-
tial local partners. 
B. Voluntary Joint Ventures 
1. Armco and Westinghouse 
All of the joint ventures studied cannot be labeled as involuntary. Several 
foreign investors sought Mexican partners initially. It is nevertheless difficult 
to determine whether those investors searched for Mexican partners aware of 
the changing attitude toward foreign equity participation or whether the joint 
venture was entered for some of the traditional voluntary reasons, e.g., 
limiting a capital outlay in a particular country or associating with Mexican 
partners who possess a critically needed input for the venture. The joint ven-
ture also may be a way of obtaining a return based on the success of the enter-
prise in addition to a fixed return for technical advice such as in the Altos Hor-
nos joint venture with Armco. Armco initially obtained only 7.5 percent of the 
equity in the venture; its principal participation was technical advice. It ap-
pears clearly to have been a voluntary joint venture and the withdrawal of 
Armco was not in any way associated with dissatisfaction of the joint venture. 
27. See notes 9, 12, 15, 23 supra. 
28. NAFINSA is Nacional Financiera, a Mexican Government-owned development bank. 
29. SOMEX is Sociedad Mexicana de Credito Industrial, a Government-owned investment 
company. 
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The Westinghouse joint venture, IEM de Mexico, appears to be similar to 
that of Altos Homos. Westinghouse was providing substantial technical 
assistance when it assumed a minority equity role which eventually reached 26 
percent. It does not appear that Westinghouse was ever interested in total 
ownership of the Mexican enterprise, at least not at the time when it first 
entered the joint venture. This nevertheless occurred during a period of active 
acquisition of Mexican companies by foreign multinationals. A majority or 
total ownership may well have been one of the alternatives discussed by of-
ficials at Westinghouse. Thus, the voluntary nature of the initial joint venture 
association could have been motivated either by a desire to be a nominal 
equity participant, as in the Altos Homos venture, or to use the joint venture 
as a fade-in institution to obtain majority or total ownership and control, 
much like the experiences of Chrysler30 and the Container Corporation. 31 
2. Holiday Inns and Sanborn Hermanos 
Two of the joint ventures in the service industry appear to have been volun-
tary. They are the Holiday Inns and Sanborn Hermanos ventures. The Holi-
day Inns operation in Mexico is really a non-equity joint venture as a result of 
the unilateral decision of the franchisees who obtained the Latin American ter-
ritory from the parent corporation. Holiday Inns generally has avoided the 
equity joint venture preferring franchise operations with local investors 
possessing total ownership of the host-nation inns. The United States fran-
chisees also decided to adopt a non-equity joint venture structure for the 
separate inns in Mexico. Each Mexican inn is operated by a corporation 
which is wholly owned by local investors.32 One might suggest that the Holi-
day Inns arrangement should not be placed in the joint venture category at all. 
While this is technically correct as far as equity joint ventures are concerned, it 
is an interesting arrangement because even though it results in a transfer of 
total ownership to host nationals, it does not result in a similar transfer of total 
management because of the unique nature of the franchise and leverage re-
tained by the franchisor. The franchising method appears consistent with the 
philosophy of the 1973 Investment Law33 in that it allows total local owner-
ship, even though 51 percent would comply with the law. The same cannot be 
said with regard to divestment of controL Continued control over many 
aspects of the franchise is exercised by the franchisor through the franchise 
contract. Such contracts are invariably one-sided. Although the Holiday Inns 
30. See § III. B.4 supra. 
31. See § III. B.3 supra. 
32. The inns in Acapulco and Taxco are exceptions. 
33. Investment Law, supra note 23. 
352 BOSTON COLLEGE INTERNATIONAL & COMPARATIVE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2, No.2 
franchise contract is among the fairest of franchise agreements of United 
States enterprises, it nevertheless offers the franchisor a great deal of leverage 
in dominating the venture if it decides that the local management is unsatisfac-
tory. The nature of the franchise agreement between developed nation multi-
nationals and franchises in Third World nations and the correlation of such 
agreements to such concepts as Mexicanization would provide a useful study. 
The Sanborn Hermanos venture in Mexico is quite unique. The Walgreen 
Company has no foreign investment other than its interest in Sanborn Her-
manos. Walgreen's initial significant minority participation has changed little. 
Absent the Mexicanization policy, one might suspect that Walgreen's would 
have attempted to increase its participation. However, there is no indication 
that the Mexican partners would have relinquished any of their interest, par-
ticularly since there was no technology leverage to use to obtain an increase. 
The Sanborn operation is one of the most voluntary and one of the most suc-
cessful of the joint venture enterprises studied. Sanborn also has sought addi-
tional capital through the Mexican stock exchange, thus establishing a con-
venient mode for further distributions were Walgreen interested in reducing 
its substantial minority participation. 
3. Heinz 
The food processing joint venture of Heinz may well be considered volun-
tary since the entire participation of Heinz beyond its initial total ownership of 
its first acquired small processing enterprises was not totally as a result of 
Government pressure. The pressure was not to accept the joint venture, but 
rather to accept the ownership itself. In that sense the joint venture aspect was 
voluntary, it appears that Heinz preferred to minimize its investment and not 
assume 100 percent ownership. While it cannot be grouped with the voluntary 
joint venture of the form represented by Sanborn Hermanos, it was 
nonetheless a joint venture albeit a unique one. 
4. Chrysler & GTE Sylvania 
The Chrysler Mexican enterprise began with a licensing agreement which 
was later followed by an acquisition of one-third of the equity. Subsequently, 
ventures involving companies which initiated their Mexican investments by 
providing technical services and obtained a nominal percent of the equity, 
sometimes later resulting in a fade-out of the equity participation, Chrysler 
used its technology and initial minority position as a base from which to in-
crease its participation to effective total foreign ownership. A similar process 
was also undertaken by GTE Sylvania. However, its initial status of providing 
technology and a subsequent acquisition of a minority interest was followed by 
the creation of a separate, wholly-owned subsidiary to further the company's 
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investment in Mexico. Chrysler had used the joint venture as a fade-in device, 
quite contrary to the fade-out approach of the joint venture which prevails in 
the Third World. 34 One might refer to the Chrysler joint venture as involun-
tary in the sense that from the beginning Chrysler expected to increase its 
equity participation and thus was unsatisfied with its status as a minority par-
ticipant. It is doubtful whether the company would have remained in Mexico 
had it been unable to obtain majority or near total ownership. The permission 
of the Mexican Government for Chrysler to increase its participation was in-
voluntary; the Mexican Government was substantially persuaded to allow 
Chrysler to increase its position because it did not have the leverage to induce 
any disinvestment by such other wholly foreign-owned automobile manufac-
turers as Ford, General Motors and Volkswagen. The Mexican 
Government's decision also was affected by its then recent substantial loss in-
curred in the production of the Borgward automobile. 35 This was a venture in 
which the Government had been a substantial participant. 
C. Voluntary v. Involuntary Joint Ventures 
When the joint venture appears to have been voluntary it generally has 
resulted in greater success for the foreign company in achieving its intended 
goals. The participation by Walgreen in the Sanborn Hermanosjoint venture 
has resulted in a long and successful partnership which has been profitable for 
Walgreen as well as the Mexican investors. The joint ventures of Altos Hornos 
and Westinghouse (IEM) also have been successful and the foreign companies 
have received fees for their technical advice and a return on their nominal 
equity participation. The acquisition by Chrysler of a minority status was suc-
cessful as a base from which the company increased its participation to nearly 
total ownership. 
Nevertheless, considering all of the case studies, the involuntary char-
acteristics predominate. The least involuntary situations include those where 
the foreign investor was using the joint venture as a fade-in device, the in-
voluntary characteristic being the foreign investors' desire not to remain only 
a nominal equity participant. It is impossible to broadly label the joint venture 
in Mexico as a totally involuntary institution. Labeled involuntary in the ex-
treme, it would seem logically to have resulted in the complete withdrawal of 
foreign participants. It remains a predominantly involuntary institution in the 
sense that a minority participation is less desirable than a majority participa-
tion and a majority participation is less desirable than total foreign ownership. 
Thus, pressures to diminish any current equity level obviously will intensify 
an involuntary situation. 
34. See note 4 supra. 
35. See note 25 supra. 
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D. Duration: Transitory v. Non- Transitory 
In addition to the characteristic of voluntariness of the joint venture, a sec-
ond important consideration is the duration of the joint venture or its degree 
of being a transitory institution. This characteristic is presumably indepen-
dent of the degree of voluntariness. The two characteristics nevertheless may 
be associated. The joint venture often is promoted by Third World govern-
ments, particularly where the foreign investor is willing to accept a minority 
position, as being an expectedly long term association. This would seem to be 
a more correct identification of a negotiated joint venture where the investor 
initially accepted a forty-nine percent position than where the joint venture is 
part of a fade-out policy, which in reality merely associates the forty-nine per-
cent majority position as one transitory stage in the ultimate elimination of all 
foreign equity participation. Having contrasted the joint venture case studies 
under the division of voluntary or involuntary, 36 it is useful to inquire addi-
tionally whether the voluntary or involuntary degree has any affect on the 
transitory nature of a given joint venture. A joint venture with a high degree 
of voluntariness might not be a transitory institution at all, but rather a ven-
ture of long term duration. Contrastingly, where the degree of involuntariness 
is high, such as where stringent fade-out legislation is adopted dealing with a 
particular industry, any venture in that industry may be quite transitory in 
nature. 
1. Government Imposed Restrictions 
The duration of ajoint venture may be limited by government restrictions. 
This is exemplified by the fade-out legislation37 adopted by the Andean Com-
mon Market38 which requires a diminution of foreign participation to 
specified levels if companies wish to take advantage of free trade among the 
member nations. 39 This form of legislation did not make the joint venture 
transitory, in the sense that joint ventures may continue to exist. This type of 
legislation which allows a stipulated period of time to eliminate foreign equity 
participation clearly would be an example of a host nation government 
decreed transitory duration status for the joint venture. If one views the An-
dean Common Market legislation40 as either too restrictive to expect to retain 
36. § IV. A, B supra. 
37. Decision 24 of Commission of the Cartagena Agreement, Common Regime of Treatment 
of Foreign Capital and of Trademarks, Patents, Licenses, and Royalties, arts. 28, 30, 33-35, 
Dec. 31, 1970, [1971) R.O. No. 264, at 1 (Ecuador), translated in 11 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 126 
(1972), as amended, translated in 16 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 138 (1977). 
38. Agreement on Andean Subregional Integration, translated in 8 INT'L LEGAL MAT'LS 910 
(1969). Bolivia, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador and Peru signed the agreement on May 26, 1969. 
Venezuela took part in the negotiations but did not sign the agreement. 
39. Id.; see also Oliver, The Andean Foreign Investment Code: A New Phase in the Questfor Normative 
Order, 66 AM.]. INT'L L. 763 (1972) [hereinafter cited as Oliver]; see notes 4,8 supra. 
40. See note 37 supra. 
1979] JOINT VENTURES IN MEXICO 355 
direct foreign investment or as the first step of a full fade-out decree, then the 
initial legislation may be viewed as effectively restricting the joint venture to a 
transitory status. 
2. Self-Imposed Restrictions 
The transitory nature of the joint venture also may be imposed by the 
foreign investor. One might view the Altos Hornos joint venture41 in which 
Armco retained a nominal 7.5 percent as a transitory joint venture, since it 
appeared from the beginning that Armco would be likely to withdraw as a 
nominal equity participant after the venture had begun to function smoothly 
or might use its nominal equity as a base to increase its participation, such as 
in the Chrysler case. 42 Where the stock ownership is as nominal as that of 
Armco, however, the foreign equity ownership tends to become rather de 
minimus. It does not differ significantly from the acquisition of a nominal 
amount of stock through the stock exchange or by purchase from one or more 
individual owners. Since the equity ownership by Armco was essentially an-
cillary to the technical arrangement with Altos Homos, the identification of 
the transitory characteristic is of less significance than in other case studies. 
V. TRANSITORY NATURE OF JOINT VENTURES 
The question of the transitory nature of the joint venture is an important 
one for a foreign investor, both when the joint venture is imposed upon the 
enterprise from the inception of the foreign investor's participation in the host 
nation and when it is part of a nationalization program. One of the contribu-
tions of a foreign investor initiating an investment is likely to be hard cur-
rency. If the joint venture is transitory to a greater degree than predicted by 
the foreign investor, such as where the pattern of foreign investment treatment 
by the host company leads to new laws applicable to the joint venture which ef-
fectively force a fade-out that could not have been predicted by the foreign in-
vestor, the latter undoubtedly would have sought different terms at the incep-
tion of its participation. For example, a company negotiating a 34 percent 
equity participation in a mining venture in Mexico in 1970, undoubtedly 
would have been quite disturbed by the alteration of the mining laws in 1976 
to further limit the foreign participation to 25 percent. 43 Even though the 
newer law was not to be applied retroactively, the investor would be concerned 
that the same form of pressure would be adopted by the Mexican Government 
to encourage a reduction of the minority foreign participation from 34 to 
25 percent. This type of pressure was used by the Government when the 
41. See § IV. B.t supra. 
42. See is III. B.4, IV. B.4 supra. 
43. Ley Reglamentaria del Articulo 27 Constitucional en Materia Minera, Dec. to, 1975, 
D.O., Dec. 22, 1975. 
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law had earlier been changed reducing the foreign investor's permitted equity 
from 49 to 34 percent. 44 
A. Attitude of the Mexican Government 
Basically the Mexican Government views all wholly and majority foreign-
owned subsidiaries in Mexico as transitory institutions. Contrastingly, those 
enterprises in which the foreign investor has accepted a minority position ap-
pear to be considered by the Government as of indefinite duration with the 
caveat that certain spheres of activity, such as mining, may be subject to a con-
tinuing review and revision of the permitted equity structure in favor of in-
creasing local ownership. In such a case the entire industry may be considered 
transitory as to foreign participation. 
The studies support this concept of the transitory nature of the joint ven-
ture. Where the joint venture appears to be viewed by both participants as 
voluntary, there seems to be a lower transitory degree than where the joint 
venture is considered by one or both parties to be involuntary. 
The Sanborn Hermanos venture45 has operated successfully since 1946 with 
no significant alteration of the minority foreign-owned equity structure. There 
has been no Government pressure on Walgreen to reduce its equity participa-
tion and the duration seems to be considered by all participants as indefinite. 
This joint venture is not transitory. 
The Heinz food processing joint venture46 involved a substantial majority 
ownership by the foreign investor. The voluntary nature appeared to be at 
least partially involuntary. While Heinz entered the enterprise with expecta-
tions of a long term and profitable relationship with its minority Mexican part-
ner, the durational aspect from the point of view of the Government is difficult 
to discern. Some observers believed that the Government was surprised that 
Heinz was so willing to purchase the unprofitable food processing units and, if 
such was the case, the Government must have viewed the joint venture quite 
desirably as one of as long a duration as possible, allowing the foreign partici-
pant to absorb the greater percent of any continued loss. In addition, it would 
seem obvious that had the venture become extremely profitable (being so 
closely connected with the sensitive area of agriculture), the Government then 
might have viewed the near wholly foreign-owned venture as increasingly 
transitory, unless a minority position were to be accepted by Heinz. The early 
withdrawal by Heinz obviously eliminates effective measurement of such 
speculation. 
H. [d. 
45. See § IV. B.2 supra. 
46. See § IV. B.3 supra. 
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B. Joint Ventures Commenced with the Foreign Participant 
Initially in a Minority Position 
357 
Several joint ventures commenced with the foreign participant initially ac-
cepting a minority position. The initial investment by Chrysler in 1959 of 33.3 
percent was considered by Chrysler as a transitory minority foreign invest-
ment. The company increased its equity to 40 percent 11 years later in 1970, 
and the following year brought its ownership to a mqiority of 65 percent. 
Subsequent to that acquisition the company has become near wholly owned by 
the parent Chrysler which holds 99.1 percent of the stock in Chrysler de Mex-
ico. GTE Sylvania differs only slightly. It also was considered transitory in its 
early stage by the United States parent. The first equity participation was a 20 
percent interest in FOCOS47 in the 1940s. A dozen years later the United 
States company created a separate, wholly foreign-owned Mexican subsidiary 
to undertake Sylvania's expanded operations in Mexico, but that interest was 
later reduced to 75 percent under pressure from the Mexican Government. 
Both Chrysler and GTE Sylvania used the joint venture as a fade-in device 
and the initial minority status in each joint venture must be considered 
therefore transitory since each company expected to alter the equity to in-
crease the foreign share. 
It is difficult to discern whether the Carton y Papel joint venture48 was con-
templated initially by the Container Corporation as being transitory, i. e.} to 
remain only fifty percent Container Corporation owned, until a greater share 
could be acquired or whether the increase to total foreign ownership occurred 
without such predetermination, but rather as a way of resolving internal cor-
porate problems. 
The use of the joint venture as a transitory institution for a fade-in to 
majority, and possibly total foreign ownership, is a mirror-image of the 
Government's view of the joint venture as a transitory vehicle to reduce total 
or majority to minority foreign ownership. A number of the joint venture 
studies, including one or more of those which remain wholly foreign-owned, 
undoubtedly have been viewed by the Government as transitory in nature. 
The companies which first commenced enterprises which have since been 
reduced to minority foreign equity, or totally phased out (Pan American 
Sulphur and Philip Morris) without doubt initially viewed their investments as 
other than transitory. 
One must define transitory in terms of the reasonably expected life of a 
Mexican investment. Any company doing business in Mexico subsequent to 
47. FOCOS was a privately-owned Mexican corporation manufacturing incandescent lamps. 
48. See § III. B.3 supra. 
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the 1938 petroleum expropriations,49 and particularly since the post-war 
origins of Mexicanization,50 should be aware that, depending on where the 
particular industry falls on the scale of priorities for local ownership, permissi-
ble equity structures are not static and the concept of a transitory institution 
assumes a rather narrow time limitation. One could reasonably speculate that 
Pan American Sulphur, operating in the mining industry, might have 
predicted that it would be subjected to pressures to permit local ownership 
because of the total foreign ownership of its Mexican subsidiary and addi-
tionally because of the generally restrictive Third World attitude toward ex-
tractive, export oriented industries. 51 
1. Philip Morris 
Predictably, the Philip Morris enterprise might have been of longer dura-
tion, although any venture which is dependent on the participation, directly or 
indirectly, of the agricultural sector, is also likely to be of limited duration. 
This is because land reform measures are increasingly being by adopted Third 
World governments to placate the real or perceived plight of the farmer. 
2. Monsanto 
Monsanto reasonably might have predicted that it could have survived for a 
longer period of time as a wholly or majority foreign-owned subsidiary, 
although the chemical industry, relying on the extractive sector for its raw 
materials, often tends to be considered similar to the mining industry. 
3. Kimberly-Clark 
Kimberly-Clark, in a sphere of operations less identified with the sensitive 
area of mining, might have expected even longer survival as a wholly or 
majority foreign-owned venture. Consequently, one might suggest that the 
49. ]. SILVA HERZOG, LA EXPROPIACION DE PETROLEO EN MEXICO (1963); Kunz, The Mexican 
Expropriation, 17 N.Y.U. L.Q. 327 (1940); see generally T.C. CALL, THE MEXICAN VENTURE 
(1953); H. F. CLINE, THE UNITED STATES AND MEXIco(1961); U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, AMERICAN-
MEXICAN CLAIMS REPORT (Pub. No. 2859, Arb. Ser. 9 1948). 
50. Mexicanization refers to local control over domestic industry. See C. REYNOLDS, THE 
MEXICAN ECONOMY (1970); Vernon, An Interpretation of the Mexican View, in How LATIN AMERICA 
VIEWS THE U.S. INVESTOR 110 (R. Vernon ed. 1966). 
51. See Gordon, Predictability of Nationalization of Foreign Private Investment in Latin America, 
SYRACUSE]. INT'L L. & COM. 123 (1973). This is not always a rational motivation. 
Objections to foreign investments in particular sectors of economic activity frequently 
arise. They can be of an economic, social or ideological nature; they often have a mixed 
character. Particularly in countries which still feel themselves to be economically or 
organizationally weak, considerations of a social or ideological nature lead more rapidly 
than elsewhere to having particular categories of activity reserved for the government or 
national entrepreneurs. Insufficient expertness then gives rise to the fear that a control 
will not lead to the desired result. 
FOUNDATION RESEARCH, supra note 8, at 75. 
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relinquishment by Kimberly-Clark of an initially minority block of forty per-
cent, and even more so an additional 13 percent, was an untimely disposition 
of equity participation at a date earlier than when the Mexican Government 
might have placed pressure on the paper products industry. It might just as 
well be considered to have been a prophetic distribution, however, justified by 
the 1973 Investment Law,52 which evidenced a broad application of Mex-
icanization. 53 One must realize that Mexicanization pressures have been ap-
plied generally when there has been almost any contact by foreign companies 
with the Mexican Government, such as requesting consent to act in anyone of 
a number of ways, principally the expansion of the production at new loca-
tions or the diversification of products. Pressures to Mexicanize have not 
resulted solely from a priority listing of industries, although that usually has 
played the most important role in the emphasis of Mexicanization at a given 
time. 
4. Gillette 
The transitory degree of the Gillette operation may be somewhere between 
that of Monsanto or Kimberly-Clark and those enterprises producing con-
sumer products which have not yet Mexicanized any portion of their opera-
tions, particularly Procter & Gamble and the Container Corporation. While 
Gillette continues as total owner of its principal Mexican subsidiary, it has ac-
cepted a forty-nine percent interest in two new enterprises created for the pro-
duction of two new products. It would seem reasonable to surmise that the 
parent Gillette officials view the new enterprises in which they have forty-nine 
percent as of predictably greater duration and thus, less transitory than the 
principal subsidiary which remains wholly foreign-owned. 
C. Factors Involved in Durational Predictions 
1. Leverage of the Corporation 
For those corporations which have not altered their total foreign ownership 
status, the durational predictions would appear to be directly related to their 
perceived leverage in dealing with the Mexican Government. That leverage is 
substantial for IBM54 which would appear reasonable in assuming that its 
wholly owned Mexican subsidiary is not a transitory institution. Any relin-
52. Investment Law, supra note 23. 
53. See Gordon, The Contemporary Mexican Approach to Growth with Foreign Investment: Controlled 
But Participatory Independence, 10 CALIF. W. L. REV. 1 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Contemporary Mex-
ican Approach]. 
54. See § III. B.2 supra. 
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quishing of a nominal amount of equity by a foreign enterprise with substan-
tial technology leverage should not suggest a transitory institution. One must 
nevertheless wonder whether sufficient leverage to remain majority foreign-
owned is not sufficient leverage to remain wholly foreign-owned. With some 
justification, managers of wholly foreign-owned enterprises believe that once 
their companies have relinquished even a nominal portion of foreign owner-
ship, the transitory level of their subsidiaries increases. If the alteration which 
resulted in the sale of a small minority of the stock was Government induced, 
the Government reasonably might believe that it could continue to persuade 
the company to reduce further its foreign equity participation. The degree of 
perceived transitoriness, both from the viewpoint of the company and the 
Government, appears to increase rapidly with the initial relinquishment by 
the foreign owner of even the most nominal equity participation. 
As the leverage of a wholly foreign-owned subsidiary decreases from the 
degree possessed by IBM, to the somewhat lesser leverage of Dow Chemical55 
or Chrysler, 56 and to even lesser leverage of the Container Corp6ration57 or 
Procter & Gamble,58 managers of those companies must pragmatically view 
their Mexican enterprises as more transitory than in the case of IBM. They 
may even have reason to believe that their companies stand to lose more by 
allowing any initial nominal share percentage to be relinquished to host nation 
ownership. Such a relinquishment by IBM might be viewed by the Mexican 
Government as more a matter of comity, than were the same to be undertaken 
by Procter & Gamble or the Container Corporation, which might be con-
sidered a recognition of insufficient leverage to retain even majority foreign 
ownership. 
2. Extent To Which Competitors Have Accepted Joint Ventures 
An additional factor which must affect the degree of transitoriness of a given 
corporate venture is the extent to which competitors have accepted the joint 
venture status. As the acceptance of the joint venture status is a given industry 
increases, the degree of transitoriness would seem to increase for those re-
maining holdouts. This would appear to affect the Dow Chemical59 Mexican 
enterprise, as well as the Container Corporation60 and Procter & Gamble,61 all 
of which have foreign-owned competitors in Mexico which have accepted 
majority or minority joint ventures. 
55. ld. 
56. See S III. B.4- supra. 
57. See SIll. B.3 supra. 
58. /d. 
59. See SIll. B.2 supra. 
60. See S III. B.3 supra. 
61. [d. 
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The transitory nature of wholly foreign-owned subsidiaries which face vary-
ing amounts of pressure to become joint venture appears interrelated to the 
question of whether the joint venture is voluntary or involuntary. The greater 
the degree of voluntariness, the less transitory is the venture from the point of 
view of both foreign and local participants, and the host nation government. 
Considering the pattern of Mexicanization and the current legislation, it is dif-
ficult to conclude that any foreign enterprise interested in operating in Mex-
ico, which receives an exception to the 1973 Investment Law from the 
National Commission on Foreign Investment allowing the company to retain 
total or majority foreign ownership of its venture, is perceived by the Mexican 
Government to be of a transitory character. 62 The petitioning for an exception 
to the Investment Law clearly illustrates the foreign enterprise's rejection of 
the joint venture. If the petition is denied, any resulting joint venture accepted 
by the company would be involuntary. 
In the case of enterprises which had been operating in Mexico prior to the 
adoption of the Investment Law, there may be similar conceptions of the 
degree of transitoriness by both management and the Mexican Government. 
The unwillingness of the supposedly "grandfathered" foreign-owned com-
pany to voluntarily alter its equity structure and accept a joint venture in-
dicates that the company considers that the joint venture is an involuntary in-
stitution. For those companies which remain wholly or majority foreign-
owned, and which have substantial leverage, both the company and the Mex-
ican Government consider the enterprises to be of much longer duration. The 
Mexican Government considers those ventures which d~ not possess extensive 
leverage to avoid conversion from total or majority foreign ownership to be 
transitory, and contrary to the expressions of management of the foreign 
enterprises, it appears logical to conclude that they too must privately view 
their ent(!rprises as transitory. 
D. Summary 
The transitory characteristic of joint ventures is obviously subject to the fact 
that time frequently changes the transitory parameters. Conclusions as to the 
transitory degree of the joint ventures in this study might be used as the basis 
for a review of those ventures in another decade or two. If the analysis regard-
ing the voluntary and involuntary nature and their transitory degree is sup-
ported by changes which occur in the future, joint venture planning may well 
be entered into with a greater degree of predictability than during the past two 
decades. It might be assumed erroneously that the time at which the current 
studies were undertaken was considered the apogee of the transition from 
foreign to Mexican ownership, an assumption which was not intended, 
62. Investment Law, supra note 23. 
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recognizing the likelihood of a continued progression to increasing host nation 
ownership and management participation in the means of production and 
distribution in Mexico and the Third World in general. 
VI. THE FUTURE OF JOINT VENTURES IN MEXICO 
The future of the joint venture in Mexico does not appear in much doubt. 
The Mexican joint venture63 is not a recently adopted institution for foreign 
investment, as one might view the joint venture in Eastern Europe,64 or the 
various methods which Peru65 has attempted in the last decade to determine 
which pattern of ownership of the means of production and distribution best 
suits its desired development goals. Assuming that the joint venture is of a 
long-term nature and a principal part of the structure of Mexican develop-
ment, it is useful to consider what alterations might be expected in the nature 
and use of the joint venture in Mexico in the forthcoming decades. The alter-
natives appear quite numerous. 
A. Future Alterations in the Nature and Use oj the Joint Venture in Mexico 
While the process of Mexicanization has succeeded to a greater degree than 
in other large developing Third World nations in Latin America, many cor-
porations in Mexico remain wholly or majority foreign-owned. The studies 
identified only a few of these corporations and illustrate that the leverage of 
companies continuing to dominate their Mexican subsidiaries varies substan-
tially. One direction which the Mexican Government may take is to continue 
to place pressure on corporations with the least amount of leverage, progress-
ing toward what it ultimately may conceive as near total Mexicanization of all 
foreign firms. This must be viewed as a very long-term goal; a number of the 
firms in Mexico which are currently wholly or majority foreign-owned possess 
sufficient leverage to discourage the Mexican Government from gambling on 
the loss of needed technology and investment. Additionally, the pace of Mex-
icanization is slowed by the absence of adequate capital to proceed more 
rapidly. 
While it is clear that the Mexican Government could assume controlling 
ownership of all foreign investments, this creates a number of difficulties. The 
Government is one of the most likely sources of large amounts of capital, but it 
63. [d. 
64. See note 18 supra. 
65. See Decree Law 20598, May 2, 1974, El Peruano, May 13, 1974 (Peru); see also Comment, 
The Peruvian Social Property Law, 16 HARV. INT'L L.J. 132 (1975); Gordon, Okolie, Calderon & 
Vaidez, Comments on the Application of Socialist Concepts of Joint Ventures to the Third World, 1975 PROC. 
AM. SOC. INT'L L. 221. 
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needs this capital for other projects, such as the continued development of the 
infrastructure and the growth of those sectors of Mexican industry which 
under the 1973 Investment Law are already limited to State ownership.66 It 
appears, therefore, that the Government may have had second thoughts about 
continuing to participate in a number of the investments in which it has 
assumed controlling ownership in the past decade. Increasingly, the Govern-
ment appears to be adopting the position that it cannot afford to subsidize los-
ing businesses, although it has received substantial reaction from various 
groups when it has suggested that it might sell some of these enterprises. 
Rather than disposing of these unsuccessful enterprises by sale, it is more 
likely that it will allow them simply to terminate naturally by withdrawing sub-
sidization. A further limiting factor for Government participation in some 
spheres of industry is the reluctance of some foreign enterprises to submit to a 
minority ownership status where the majority is held by the Government. 
The reasons usually expressed by foreign investors are that government-
owned industries hav~, and perhaps should have, a different goal than foreign, 
privately owned industry. These goals are viewed as inconsistent with the 
goals of the foreign investors. It appears predictable that a wholly or majority 
foreign-owned investment would be more likely to withdraw from Mexico if 
the investor had to assume minority participation with the Government as the 
majority partner than if the association was to be with private Mexican in-
vestors. The discussion with company officials supported the view that, in 
most cases, the Mexican market is not so important as to justify accepting a 
minority participation if the majority is to be entirely owned by the Mexican 
Government. 67 The exception may be the extractive, export oriented in-
dustries. 68 
66. The areas reserved for the State are petroleum and other hydrocarbons, basic 
petrochemicals, exploitation of radioactive minerals and the generation of nuclear power, mining 
in cases to which the relative law refers, electricity, railroads, telegraphic and wireless com-
munications, and other activities established in specific laws. Investment Law, supra note 23, art. 
4; see also Contemporary Mexican Approach, supra note 53. 
67. In general, the disadvantages of local equity participation for the multinational may be 
classified into four principal categories: 
(1) Problems originating from the suboptimization of profit allocation which occurs 
when a foreign subsidiary, of necessity, is treated as an autonomous decision-making 
unit; (2) problems arising from the need to protect proprietary knowledge or abilities; 
(3) problems arising from the difference between the costs of capital in the MNE parent 
country and that in the local subsidiary's market; and (4) the capacity of the capital 
markets to absorb stock issues of the size necessary to provide a meaningful local par-
ticipation in the subsidiaries of large MNE's. 
Ness, Brazil: Local Equity Participation in Multinational Enterprises, 6 LAW & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 1017, 
1020 (1974) (citations omitted). 
68. See note 66 supra. 
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B. The 1973 Legislation 
The 1973 Investment Law69 is an adequate vehicle for limiting future 
foreign investment in Mexico to minority foreign participation. That law 
could be amended so as to apply retroactively and constitute nationalizing 
legislation. It thus could assume the overtones of Decision 24 of the Andean 
Common Market,70 which requires foreign investment to fade-out over a 
stipulated time period. It is doubtful that the Mexican Government will adopt 
such legislation for several reasons. Decision 24 has not been immensely suc-
cessful/I although one must realize that its implementation has been impeded 
by the conflicting and changing interests of several of the participating na-
tions, notably Chile. Chile withdrew from the Market for reasons closely iden-
tified with the restrictiveness of the foreign investment limitations of the An-
dean group, particularly Decision 24. A more practical reason for Mexico to 
avoid broad nationalization legislation is the preferred and less disruptive and 
antagonistic practice of selecting target companies or industries for ad-
ministrative pressure or special legislation. This should not be construed as an 
implementation of the 1973 Investment Law retroactively,72 but as an attempt 
by persuasion to require an alteration in the composition of ownership of cer-
tain companies or industries. It might assume the form of the mining laws, 
where additional tax incentives have made a minority foreign ownership share 
more attractive financially than continued majority foreign ownership. Such 
tax legislation is a positive approach to Mexicanization pressures, in contrast 
to the withholding of needed imports, a device which may be equally suc-
cessful, but which does not help either Mexican development or relations with 
current and potential foreign investors. 
Of concern to corporations operating in the joint venture form,73 or being 
69. Investment Law, supra note 23. 
70. See note 3 supra. 
71. Oliver, supra note 39. 
72. There are provisions for the retroactive application of the Transfer of Technology Law. See 
note 3 supra. 
73. One source of concern has been the emergence of social property concepts. In the last half 
decade, there has been some indication that Latin American nations are considering the ap-
propriateness of workers' social property concepts, such as contained in the Yugoslav law. See 
Peseij, Socialist Law and the New Yugoslav Constitution, 51 GEO. L.J. 651 (1953); Van Doren, Owner-
ship of Yugoslav Social Property and United States Industrial Property - A Comparison, 26 RUTGERS L. 
REV. 73 (1972). The most extensive social property legislation was adopted by Peru in 1974, but 
this law was limited in scope and has not been successful. See note 65 supra. Jamaica and several 
Latin American nations have discussed the adoption of workers' social property concepts. Mex-
ico adopted a very limited social solidarity law in 1976, which was the first introduction of 
workers' social property concepts in the Mexican economy. Ley de Sociedades de Solidaridad 
Social, May 26,1976, D.O., May 27,1976. 
If workers' social property concepts are successful in whatever limited spheres they are initially 
adopted in Mexico, a new form of pressure will face not only joint ventures, but all private invest-
ment. Those companies remaining totally or majority foreign-owned would appear to have 
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pressured to operate in that form, is the increasing matrix of legislation gov-
erning foreign investment. Although not limited to companies participating in 
joint ventures, any legislation viewed as restrictive by foreign investors will af-
fect a company's willingness to accept a minority joint venture position. For 
the most part, restrictive legislation will be viewed unfavorably, and may lead 
companies to consider a Mexican investment as undesirable if it must accept a 
minority position. Contrastingly, it may view a minority equity position in the 
joint venture as acceptable, if it is able to associate with local private investors, 
either in groups or through a stock exchange distribution. 
C. Factors Affecting Joint Ventures in Mexico 
There are several factors which will affect the future role of the joint venture 
in Mexico. One might suggest that the population problem and the lack of 
distributable land to comply with notions of land reform evolving from the 
Revolution may lead to extreme social upheaval, and even a new revolution, 
which would totally restructure the Mexican economy. More optimistic view-
points, however, suggest that Mexico will continue to be successful in 
forestalling such disruptive extremes. Assuming Mexico's ability to avoid 
leverage not only to preclude Mexicanization, but also any alteration of their enterprises which 
would include accepting concepts of workers' social property. Those concepts would be adopted 
through legislation which required new businesses to be owned by workers in a manner similar to 
the view prevailing in Yugoslavia. This would not appear to be a successful approach for Mexico, 
however, since it would constitute a far more drastic alteration for new businesses, in contrast to 
the alterations of ownership and control regulated by the 1973 Investment Law. 
Where joint ventures are required for new investment, prospective foreign investors have com-
plained that accepting minority ownership would place them at a disadvantage in contrast to ex-
isting companies which may remain totally foreign-owned. The argument is that a joint venture 
is less efficient and can not compete with a wholly foreign-owned company. That same argument 
would appear to apply, much more forcefully, were new companies to be owned and governed by 
workers, while existing companies could continue in the traditional form of management control 
by the foreign owners. If social property concepts are to be adopted, it thus would appear to re-
quire a much more encompassing law which would be retroactive in application. It is quite 
predictable that there would be a period of extreme economic disruption during such conversion 
process. It may be doubtful whether concepts of workers' social property can be successfully 
adopted in a short period of time without such drastic economic and political upheaval as oc-
curred in Cuba and Eastern Europe. If success is possible, it would appear to require a very slow 
conversion. Workers in industrialized nations are participating increasingly in both management 
and ownership of corporations, a process which will undoubtedly continue. Worker participation 
in management is likely to be accepted in the United States much later than in other industrial-
ized nations, principally because of the lack of a federal corporation law. The increasing presence 
of worker participation in management in the industrialized nations of Western Europe, 
however, illustrates that workers' social property concepts might be implemented in a capitalist 
nation without chaotic upheaval, as long as it is introduced slowly and rationally. United States 
companies operating in Western Europe have adapted to worker participation in management 
and therefore should be prepared to confront the issue when it reaches the United States. For a 
discussion of labor participation in management through the collective bargaining process in the 
U.S., see Comment, Regulation of the Labor Relations of Multinational Enterprises: A Comparative 
Anarysis and a Propvsalfor NLRA Reform, 2 B.C. INT'L & COMPo L. REV. 371 (1979). 
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revolutionary changes, either through means used in the past few decades or 
through its ability to improve the quality of life through effective use of the 
proceeds from its increasingly large reserve of petroleum, periodic structural 
alterations in Mexican economic institutions are likely to continue. The struc-
ture of permitted foreign investment predictably will be subject to increasing 
and constantly changing pressures. What role the vast reserves of petroleum 
will play is difficult to assume, but it appears that petroleum will provide the 
base for some of the same kind of leverage in dealing with foreign investors 
which foreign investors have utilized in the past in dealing with the Mexican 
Government. 
The joint venture is going to remain an important institution in Mexico in 
the near future. However, the involuntary and transitory nature of the joint 
venture may change, at least in part because of Mexico's increasingly impor-
tant role in the international economic sphere. 
D. Future of the Joint Venture in Central America 
Similar studies of several joint ventures in the Central American nations 
and Panama illustrate, at least at this early stage of research, 74 that joint ven-
tures in those nations tend to be more voluntary, as well as less transitory, 
than joint ventures in Mexico. None of the Central American nations have 
enacted foreign investment legislation at all comparable to either the Mexican 
1973 Investment Law7s or Decision 24 of the Andean Common Market.16 
This should not be surprising; none of these nations has sufficient leverage to 
extract from foreign investment the concessions obtained by such larger 
nations as Mexico and several of the members of the Andean group.77 It \s 
doubtful that the small and dependent nations of Central America will in the 
foreseeable future possess the leverage to extract from foreign investors joint 
ventures in broad classes of industries. Foreign investment incentive legisla-
tion in these nations has been directed to encouraging foreign investment. 
Since individually these nations have small markets, and since there has been 
little cohesiveness to the Central American Common Market, foreign enter-
prises in most instances are able to dictate their own terms for foreign invest-
ment. Joint ventures nevertheless exist in two important spheres: The first is 
for large extractive export oriented investments and the second is for franchise 
74. See note 2 supra. 
75. Investment Law, supra note 23. 
76. Decision 24, supra note 37. 
77. Two laws in Central America mandating joint ventures are the forestry and distributor-
ship laws of Honduras. Decree Law 103, Jan. 10, 1974 (forestry); Decree Law 549 (distributor-
ship). See generally Gordon, Developed, Developing and Dependmt Nations: Central AIr.mcan Development 
in a New Economic Realignment, 10 REV. JUR. U.I.A. 235 (1976). The forestry law has had com-
paratively little impact on the forestry industry; joint ventures in Honduras at this date have not 
been analyzed by this writer. 
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operations. Three major extractive investments have been subjects of recent 
research. 78 
The EXMIBAL nickel investment in Guatemala initially was to be wholly 
owned by Inco Limited (International Nickel), but negotiations with the 
Government, a nearly 20 year process, ultimately resulted in a joint venture 
arrangement. The local participation, which will be principally nationally 
owned, will be limited to approximately thirty percent. A second major ex-
tractive enterprise in Guatemala is the Shenandoah oil project. This is not a 
joint venture with local participation, but is a joint venture between two 
developed nation enterpriseS. Shenandoah Oil Corporation owns 37.5 per-
cent, with Basic Resources International, S.A., a Luxembourg company, 
owning the balance. 79 The Guatemalan petroleum law does not require equity 
joint ventures, but it does specify that the nation must receive fifty-five percent 
of the enterprise's revenues, and controls the minimum amount of invest-
ment, number of wells to be drilled and the method of exploring each licensed 
area. 80 
An oil pipeline is planned from the area of the Shenandoah project to a 
Caribbean port. The pipeline may be a joint venture with Guatemalan par-
ticipation. Early announcements suggested that the Shenandoah consortium 
would construct the pipeline, with Guatemala possessing acquisition rights to 
fifty-one percent of the equity. 
At the time of the formation of the Shenandoah project, the prospect for oil 
in Guatemala was not particularly encouraging and the Government was not 
in the position to extract equity participation from the venture. A number of 
exploration projects have been abandoned after unsuccessful searches. The 
Guatemalan Government currently is negotiating for additional oil explora-
tion. Foreign petroleum enterprises have shown substantial interest, at-
tributable partly to the comparatively recent oil discoveries in states in Mexico 
adjacent to the Guatemalan border. The discovery of large commercial quan-
tities of oil in Guatemala may grant that nation the leverage to extract joint 
ventures from current or future foreign investors. It also may have an impor-
tant impa~t on the future role of Guatemala in Central America. The posses-
sion of significant petroleum resources will make Guatemala less dependent 
upon other Central American nations for economic development and may 
have an impact on the future of that market. 
The third major extractive project in Central America is in Panama and is 
yet to become operational. It is the Cerro Colorado copper mining project 
78. See note 2 supra. 
79. Shenandoah subsequently agreed to transfer one-third of its equity, 12.5 percent, to BEA 
Petroleum Ltd., 79 percent owned by Basic Resources. 
80. Ley de Petroleo, Decree 96-75, Diario de Centro America, Dec. 22, 1975. 
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which originally was to be a joint venture between the Panamanian Govern-
ment and Canadian Javelin Ltd. Javelin withdrew as a participant, and 
Texasgulf agreed to assume a minority equity (twenty percent) role, with the 
Panamanian Government owning the majority (eighty percent). 
E. Large Extractive Joint Ventures in Central America 
Tend to be Transitory and Involuntary 
Joint ventures in Central American nations in the extractive, export 
oriented industries are involuntary institutions. The foreign enterprises have 
not sought joint ventures with local governments, but have agreed to such 
arrangements as a precondition to the investment. Texasgulf voluntarily 
accepted its twenty percent interest in the Cerro Colorado copper project, but 
as a condition of the Panamanian Government. The EXMIBAL joint venture 
was less voluntary. It was agreed to by International Nickel after it expected to 
commence operations as the sole equity owner of the project. 
These joint ventures are also transitory. The Texasgulf agreement is for 
twenty years, at the end of which time Panama has the option of continuing 
the project as a joint venture or buying out the Texasgulf twenty percent 
equity. The Guatemala petroleum code limits contracts to twenty years. The 
EXMIBAL project was first licensed for forty years with a twenty year exten-
sion, terms later codified in a 1965 mining law. Whether the contracts survive 
their terms depends substantially upon both political stability and a continued 
Government satisfaction with its share of the benefits. Since the Central 
American nations have less leverage in negotiating with foreign investors than 
the larger developing nations, and because the prospects for rapid economic 
development appear comparatively poor, it is unlikely that changing develop-
ment levels in these nations will increase national leverage and cause the ven-
tures to be "renegotiated" before their contracted expiration dates. 
The experience of extractive industries in many parts of the world illustrates 
they are one of the most probable spheres for pressures for nationalization. 81 
The joint venture may soften or slow the blow of nationalization, but it also 
has importance beyond the sphere of extractive industries. This is illustrated 
by the experience of foreign investment in Mexico. There is no comparable 
experience in Central America with the use of the joint venture and it is 
unlikely that there will be unless increasing leverage is acquired by the Central 
American nations as an economic unit. This might occur through the effective 
restoration of the Central American Common Market. 82 
The Market has lain dormant for a decade. Occasional gasps of life are 
emitted from the secretariat SIECA83 in Guatemala, but there is little prospect 
81. See Contemporary Mexican Approach, supra note 53. 
82. See generally ECONOMIC INTEGRATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA (W. Cline & E. Delgado eds. 
1978) [hereinafter cited as CENTRAL AMERICA]. 
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for the restoration ofthe Market in the immediate future. If the Market can be 
restored, it will be as a result of a much more benign treaty than that proposed 
by the Central American Ministers of Economics and Finance in 1965. 84 The 
Ministers agreed in their Declaration of San Lucas85 that a restored market 
agreement should include joint venture mandates for foreign investments. 
The recommendations were never implemented. A new draft treaty, subse-
quently proposed in 1976, also included joint ventures as favored ar-
rangements. 86 Close observers of the Central American Common Market 
tend to view the 1976 draft as exceptionally impracticable. A restored Market 
is likely to occur with a more modest agreement which will not introduce 
restrictive concepts regulating foreign investment, requiring rather than 
merely encouraging joint ventures. 
Thus, the joint venture prognosis for Central America tends to be limited to 
large investments in which the government plays an active part in the initial 
negotiations. Wholly foreign-owned status, currently the case in the vast ma-
jority of foreign investments in Central America, will continue to be the for-
mat for general manufacturing activities. 87 
F. Summary 
The studies suggest that the degree to which joint ventures are transitory 
and involuntary institutions is dependent principally upon the ability of a 
developing nation to utilize one or more of several forms of leverage to extract 
local equity participation from prospective or current foreign investment. The 
joint venture has been more successful in those developing nations with stable 
governments where joint ventures may be obligatory, and consequently usu-
ally involuntary, but where the stability of the government offers some pre-
dictability to the prospective duration of the joint venture arrangement. When 
a foreign investor decides to invest, durational predictability is an important 
factor. It appears even more so for the joint venture where the foreign investor 
clearly assumes the additional obligations of an undertaking with potential 
partnership disagreements, the form many joint ventures possess. Unstable 
governments make the durational aspect less predictable. It thus would appear 
that a nation such as Argentina, which has pursued successively contrasting 
83. SEICA is the permanent Secretariat of the Organization of Central American States 
(ODECA). See D. MCCLELLAND. THE CENTRAL AMERICAN COMMON MARKET: ECONOMIC 
POLICIES, ECONOMIC GROWTH AND CHOICES FOR THE FUTURE 174n.· (1972). 
84. CENTRAL AMERICA, supra note 82. 
85. Declaration of San Lucas of 1965, SEICA Doc. Acta No.5 del Consejo Economico Centro 
Americano Gune 21, 1965). 
86. Proyecto de Tratado de la Comunidad Economica y Social Centroamericana, Mar. 1976. 
87. This should not suggest a diminished use of occasional voluntary joint ventures for 
manufacturing activities, when benefits exist to such a form of joint venture. Professor Freid-
mann has described the motivations for voluntary joint ventures. FREIDMANN & KALMANOFF 
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policies of nationalization, followed by denationalization, followed by 
nationalization, and, more recently, a modified denationalization, will cause 
significant investor concern. It may lead investors to conclude that the addi-
tional efforts to devise an expectantly long term joint venture may be nullified 
if government instability occurs. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
The joint venture experience in Mexico is viewed very positively by the vast 
majority of Mexican Government personnel and local business entrepreneurs. 
This success in Mexico should not be interpreted to mean that the joint ven-
ture might be a prototype for all developing nations. It has functioned well in 
Mexico because of unique conditions in that nation, e.g., government stability 
and the slow, decades-long development of the joint venture as an investment 
institution. It undoubtedly will continue to be the principal form for Mexican 
foreign investment and increasingly will be observed by other developing na-
tions. Research involving the joint venture will make available information to 
permit its adoption where success is most predictable. While it is a highly 
developed institution in Mexico, it has yet to be utilized effectively in many 
other of the larger developing nations. It is unlikely to be a significant form of 
investment in the smaller, dependent Third World nations, except for some of 
the more visible industries, principally those involved in extractive, export 
oriented endeavors. 
